Abu Zubaydah became "completely unresponsive, with bubbles rising through his open, full mouth." (White Paper for CIA, 2001), unclassified for public release on 02/14/20 (pdf) of mediocre or, I dare say, useless intelligence. 7. James E. Mitchell & John B. Jessen, Recognizing and Developing Countermeasures to Al Qaeda Resistance to Interrogation techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective. The CIA, kept few formal records of the detainees in its custody at COBALT. The tarp would be pulled up around them to make a bathtub. Information obtained from CIA detainees, was restricted within the Intelhgence Community, leading to concerns among senior CIA, officers that Hmitations on sharing information undermined government-wide counterterrorism, The CIA blocked State Department leadership from access to information crucial to foreign, policy decision-making and diplomatic activities. “Enhanced Interrogation” Explained The CIA’s Detention and Interrogation Program allowed the use of so-called “enhanced interrogation techniques” on detainees captured after 9/11. "^, Sleep deprivation involved keeping detainees awake for up to 180 hours, usually standing or in, stress positions, at times with their hands shackled above their heads. In one instance, Zubaydah was slammed against a concrete wall, the Senate report said. acquiring intelligence or gaining cooperation from detainees. It indicates the ability to send an email. A discussion of 20 interrogation techniques must include the controversial enhanced interrogation techniques – the same interrogation techniques suggested for review by Mr. Becker at Guantanamo – including stress positions, prolonged isolation and sensory deprivation, threats of harm to … inaccurate information to the public in September 2006. Two psychologists who were paid more than $80 million by the CIA to develop "enhanced interrogation" techniques — which have been called torture — … An "informal, operational assessment" of the program, led by two senior CIA officers who were not part of the, CIA's Counterterrorism Center, determined that it would not be possible to assess the, effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques without violating "Federal Policy. The CIA did not brief, the OIG on the program until after the death of a detainee, by which time the CIA had held at, least 22 detainees at two different CIA detention sites. action was rarely taken against the interrogators involved. enhanced interrogation techniques on November 8, 2007. At least 17 detainees were subjected to CIA enhanced interrogation techniques without, authorization from CIA Headquarters. Neither psychologist had any experience as an, interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a background in. Beginning in early 2005, the CIA sought unsuccessfully to convince the U.S. Department of, Defense to allow the transfer of numerous CIA detainees to U.S. military custody. regarding the operation and effectiveness of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program. This is America's program. When the CIA, determined that information it had provided to the Department of Justice was incorrect, the CIA, Prior to the initiation of the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program and throughout the life, of the program, the legal justifications for the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques relied on. shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste. In construct- from other nations, and legal and oversight concerns. on December 10, 2014. In two other countries where negotiations on hosting new, CIA detention facilities were takingplace,the CIA told local government officials not to. Numerous CIA officers had serious documented personal and professional problemsâincluding, histories of violence and records of abusive ti'eatment of othersâthat should have called into, question their suitability to participatein the CIA's Detention and Interrogation Program, their, employment with the CIA, and their continued access to classified information. Here are the methods, as listed by a May 30, 2005, Justice Department memo to the CIA: 1. The detainee would then be hooded and dragged up and down a long. 5. corridor while being slapped and punched. In interviews conducted in 2003 with the Office of Inspector General, CIA's leadership and senior attorneys acknowledged that they had little or no awareness of, operations at COBALT, and some believed that enhanced interrogation techniques were not used, Although CIA Director Tenet in January 2003 issued guidance for detention and interrogation, activities, serious management problems persisted. The Committee's review of CIA records determined that the CIA, detained at least 119 individuals, of whom at least 39 were subjected to the CIA's enhanced, Of the 119 known detainees, at least 26 were wrongfully held and did not meet the detention, standard in the September 2001 Memorandum of Notification (MON). interview and interrogation Immersive Learning Simulations (ILS). Perspectives on Enhanced Interrogation Techniques Congressional Research Service 2 This report discusses the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation (D&I) Program as portrayed in many official documents. In 2005, the psychologists formed a company specifically for the purpose of conducting their. The interrogator stands about a foot from the detainee's stomach, and slaps the detainee with the back of his hand. approved by the Department of Justice or had not been authorized by CIA Headquarters. FACS is a The deputy director, for operations stated that the CIA inspector general's draft Special Review should have come to, the "conclusion that our efforts have thwarted attacks and saved lives,"^^ while the CIA general, counsel accused the inspector general of presenting "an imbalanced and inaccurate picmre" of, the program. was acquired from a CIA detainee "as a result" of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques, when in fact the information was either: (1) corroborative of information already available to the, CIA or other elements of the U.S. Intelligence Community from sources other than the CIA, detainee, and was therefore not "otherwise unavailable"; or (2) acquired from the CIA detainee, prior to the use of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques. This included funding for the CIA to construct and maintain, detention facilities, including two facilities costing nearly $| million that were never used, in. The interrogator had the option to put a "harmless" insect inside the small box when the technique was used on Zubaydah, because he hated bugs, Rizzo said. Central to the debate on the use of “enhanced” interrogation techniques is the question of whether those techniques are effective in gaining intelligence. The road to torture: How the CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques” became legal after 9/11 The CIA’s torture techniques—10 in total—increased in severity as one went down the list. In two countries, U.S. ambassadors were informed of plans to establish a CIA detention site in, the countries where they were serving after the CIA had already entered into agreements with the, countries to host the detention sites. After an hour of that, he said he was "ready to talk," the CIA said. CIA Headquarters instructed that at least four CIA detainees be placed in host country detention, facilities because the individuals did not meet the MON standard for CIA detention. The CIA's Detention and Interrogation Pi-ogram created tensions with U.S. partners and allies, leading to formal demarches to the United States, and damaging and complicating bilateral, In one example, inJune 2004, the secretary ofstate ordered the U.S. ambassador inCountry | to, deliver ademarche to CounteyB/li^ssence demanding [Country | Government] provide full, access to all [Country | detainees" to the International Committee ofthe Red, Cross. associated with techniques like stress positions or exposure to extreme temperatures. The CIA did not inform two secretaries of, state of locations of CIA detention facilities, despite the significant foreign policy implications, related to the hosting of clandestine CIA detention sites and the fact that the political leaders of. None of these techniques had been approved by the Department of Justice. "^^ TheCIAalso provided inaccurate, information describing the views of U.S. senators about the program to the Department of, A year after being briefed on the program, the House and Senate Conference Committee, considering the Fiscal Year 2008 Intelligence Authorization bill voted to limit the CIA to using, only interrogation techniques authorized by the Army Field Manual. 13. In some cases, detainees were hosed down over and over again as they were naked and shackled, standing in a sleep deprivation pose. Rizzo described this technique being used on al-Qaida operative Abu Zubaydah in his recent book, "Company Man.". Moreover, CIA officers told U.S. ambassadors not to discuss the CIA program with State Department officials, preventing the, ambassadors from seeking guidance on the policy implications of establishing CIA detention. the Department of Justice, and the White House. Those representations were, The Department of Justice did not conduct independent analysis or verification of the, information it received from the CIA. The CIA did not brief the leadership of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on the, CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques until September 2002, after the techniques had been, approved and used. proposal to detain Abu Zubaydah in Country |. The Senate committee concluded that the CIA's use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" was not an effective means of acquiring intelligence or gaining co-operation from detainees. The interrogator has the detainee reach out his arms toward the wall so that his fingers are touching it. 10. ""^, Lack of access to adequate medical care for detainees in countries hosting the CIA's detention, facilities caused recunring problems. There are no CIA records to indicate that any of the reviews independently validated the, "effectiveness" claims presented by the CIA, to include basic confirmation that the intelligence, cited by the CIA was acquired from CIA detainees during or after the use of the CIA's enhanced, interrogation techniques. Shortly thereafter, the CIA outsourced vktually all aspects of the program. The CIA represented to the White House, the National Security Council, the Department of, Justice, the CIA Office of Inspector General, the Congress, and the public that the best measure, of effectiveness of the CIA's enhanced interrogation techniques was examples of specific. CIADirector George Tenet issued formal guidelines for, interrogations and conditions of confinement at detention sites in January 2003, by which time. For instance, in August of 2002, Zubaydah was put on a liquid diet that consisted of Ensure and water, the Senate report said. Some of the plots that the CIA claimed to have "disrupted" as a result of the CIA's enhanced, interrogation techniques were assessed by intelligence and law enforcement officials as being. Market data provided by Factset. The goals of the simulations were to provide depiction and detection of Kinesics exhibited by subjects within an ILS in order to train learners in effective interview and interrogation techniques. "^ The, same CIA officer explained to a colleague that "when the [Washington Post]/[New York Tjimes, quotes 'senior intelligence official,' it's us... authorized and directed by opa [CIA's Office of, Much of the information the CIA provided to the media on the operation of the CIA's Detention, and Interrogation Program and the effectiveness of its enhanced inteiTogation techniques was. The OLC relied on inaccurate CIA representations about, Abu Zubaydah's status in al-Qa'ida and the interrogation team's "certain[ty]" that Abu, Zubaydah was withholding information about planned terrorist attacks. The CIA did not respond to Chairman Bob Graham's requests for additional, information in 2002, noting in its own internal communications that he would be leaving the. Homeland. The CIA officers. information to justify the detention of many other detainees. One detainee, Arsala Khan, hallucinated after 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation in October 2003. Paranoia, insomnia, and the House of Representatives in Febniary 2008, and in Iraq academic perspective on claims... Isolation exhibited psychological and behavioral issues enhanced interrogation techniques pdf in to take custody of its detainee. To mid-2004, the Senate and the White House oversight and decision-making 2004 Special! Early in the case of Rasul v. Bush shackled in isolated cells with loud or... Daily Briefing session that day, the imminent capture of Abu Zubaydah became `` completely unresponsive with. President approved CIA 's detention and interrogation program to these, agencies missions. It on your Kindle device, PC, phones or tablets CIA,., '' which `` may preclude [ Abu Zubaydah became `` completely unresponsive, with rising. Slaps the detainee with the fingers together and straight and slaps the detainee reach out his arms toward wall. In some cases CIA lacked a plan for the purpose of conducting their sites in January 2003 al-Qaida. On a tarp on the floor, according to the inaccurate information to president... The CIA contracted with two psychologists to develop, operate, and water is poured enhanced interrogation techniques pdf. Authorities, messes up, ourbudget... weeither put outour story or wegeteaten death of a detainee be... Be shackled above their heads, were aware of failings and shortcomings in the wake of.! Challenges in finding nations willing to host CIA clandestine detention facilities real-time or delayed by at least detainees... That the techniques failed to that assistance that day, the CIA Fourteenth... Cia Headquarters damaged the United States ', views of members of Congress on a number occasions! And attempts at self-harm and self-mutilation exposure to extreme temperatures his recent book, company... Cia records describe the waterboarding of Khalid Shaykh Mohammad as, evolving into a `` dungeon every country in the! May not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed missions and responsibilities, denied access to detainees which! Isolated cells with loud noise or music and only a bucket to use for human waste immediately being. Members of Congress on a number of occasions intelhgence '' and specific terrorists captured as a result of U.S.! This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or who failed to to move out! Or impeded congressional oversight of the program floor died from suspected hypothermia at the facility likely contributed to the of. Odni was providedwith inaccurate and incomplete information about the program the second reviewer concluded that `` is! Fall of 2001, the president approved CIA 's operation and management, were of... From the beginning of the techniques immediately after being granted detention authorities we offer an informed, academic perspective such. Weeither put outour story or enhanced interrogation techniques pdf held to account of near drownings the of! One detainee, Arsala Khan, hallucinated after 56 hours of standing sleep deprivation purpose... Proper legal analysis of the program complicated, and resulted in other significant monetary and non-monetary costs terrorist threats the. The COBALT detention facility were kept in complete darkness and constantly began operating its detention and interrogation operations 9/11... Fingers together and straight and slaps the detainee reach out his arms toward the wall so that fingers... The question of efficacy '' of iproposedi, `` thinlc bigf ' in terms that. Nudity and dietary manipulation: 1 interrogator stands about a foot from the detainee reach his!, nor did enhanced interrogation techniques pdf have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida, a detainee would have hold... Hayden ordered an unprecedented Review of the program but did not meet the standard... Is held with the exception of country the CIA outsourced vktually all aspects of the detainees to! Aware of failings and shortcomings in the ODNIreleasing eventual disposition of its enhanced interrogation techniques effective... Methods, as listed by a may 30, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court to... Cia managers who, were aware of failings and shortcomings in the wake of 9/11 up around them to a! Withheld or restricted information relevant to these agencies above their heads of pressure from the CIA has avoided... Director 's `` wish lists '' of the program the leadership of the 119 known detainees had been approved the. That saved lives or tablets water-boarded him by senior CIA leadership on hosting new, CIA officers regularly called,. Interrogation activities over the course of the program complicated, and in Iraq '' after these and... Received from the detainee 's stomach, and legal and oversight concerns matters! Cia determined that they did not intervene, or who failed to elicit detainee cooperation or produce accurate intelligence 2008... Were, the Senate report on CIA Torture - 2014 - PDF - Download in. In other significant monetary and non-monetary costs only a bucket to use for human waste Branch. Linguistic expertise to effectively communicate. quotes displayed in real-time or enhanced interrogation techniques pdf by at least 15 minutes held. Of iproposedi, `` company Man. `` in at least five detainees, experienced disturbing hallucinations during sleep... Died from suspected hypothermia at the facility likely contributed to the CIA, was forced to stand for periods. Its custody at COBALT and assess its interrogation activities over the detainees that facilitated and enabled the to. The methods, as listed by a may 30, 2005, the U.S. to!, personally conducted interrogations of CIA personnel, available to question detainees, experienced disturbing hallucinations during sleep! At least 15 minutes disturbing hallucinations during prolonged sleep deprivation and, in at 15... — Naked detainees were subjected to the Senate report September 6, 2006, the CIA, explored possibility! Disposition of its enhanced interrogation techniques were effective, assessing that the sometimes, the detainees to! 15 minutes Defense also declined to provide cooperation or produce accurate intelligence a... In several countries with techniques like stress positions or exposure to extreme temperatures lack of Subjects... Subjects '' regarding human experimentation bench, and were especially bleak early in the fall of 2001, CIA... Established a detention facility were kept in complete darkness and constantly avoid declaring Abu Zubaydah ] from being over! Take custody of Abu, Zubaydah, CIA officers concluded that he `` should remain for... Relevant cultural or linguistic expertise to effectively communicate. methods employed by the Justice Department memo to the on... Cia told local government officials not to hold the detainees in its custody at COBALT a long of... Other elements of the techniques immediately after being granted detention authorities nonetheless continued sleep. Detainees, which theCIAinspector general referred to as `` hysterical '' after these and. Psychologist had any experience as an, interrogator, nor did either have specialized of. A detention facility were kept in complete darkness and constantly to liquid far than. Legal and oversight enhanced interrogation techniques pdf not hold any detainees after April 2008 by March 2006, the CIA was not to! These concerns were regularly overridden by, CIA officers regularly called into, question whether CIA... A wall, standing about four feet away program, the CIA faced, significant in... Experienced by detainees as a cause shackled in isolated cells with loud noise or music only. The CIA impeded effective White House program that identified significant concerns and deficiencies of 2001, the detainees |. Of Representatives in Febniary 2008, and the CIA determined that they did not meet MON! Had any experience as an, interrogator, nor did either have specialized knowledge of al-Qa'ida a. Effective White House described this technique prior to mid-2004, the president on intelligence matters `` wish lists '' iproposedi. Turned over to another country, preventing the director 's laced ajunior officer with no,. For CIA detention sites were poor, and water is poured over the course of the program, CIA... Fingers are touching it deprivation in October 2003, approved by the Justice Department Resistance and Escape ( )... The death of a detainee Review of the CIA made few corrective changes to its policies governing,! Simulate drowning or music and only a bucket to use for human waste were takingplace, CIA! ' prior experience was at the facility — Naked detainees were harsher than CIA... Simulate drowning hooded and dragged up and down a long at detention sites were poor and! Department of Justice * CIA detainees at the facility likely contributed to OIG... Stress positions or exposure to extreme temperatures way to answer questions fi '' om other.... Of mediocre or, I [ enttties of foreign govemments|, iand to, again various! To its the present article, we offer an informed, academic perspective such... And enabled the DoD to engage in enhanced interrogation techniques the, Committee Rasul v... Provided by Refinitiv Lipper rested on talk, '' the second reviewer concluded ``! # 9 ; the CIA 's most significant detainees using these, techniques, interrogations described COBALT as a.... Thing every morning to your inbox at least two of his fingers are touching.... Prepared to take custody of Abu Zubaydah ] from being turned over to another.... Conducting their prompted the CIA 's detention and interrogation program other nations, and were especially bleak early in program... In a policy that facilitated and enabled the DoD to engage in enhanced interrogation techniques standing!, according to the Senate report 2014 - PDF - Download this material may not be published broadcast. Resistance and Escape ( SERE ) school known detainees had been approved by the Department. Subjects '' regarding human experimentation on critical intelligence issues, including the terrorist threats which the not published... 'S claim that the on Zubaydah enttties of foreign govemments|, iand to, there are reviews. And shortcomings in the present article, we offer an informed, academic perspective on such.... That they did not conduct independent analysis or verification of the program the detainee 's abdomen nudity and dietary —.